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Which Settlement Date Does the Short Interest Number on Your Screen Describe

Three Clocks Sit Behind One Short Interest Field Open a US equity on almost any broker page and you will find a line labeled short interest: a share count, often a percentage of float beside it, sometimes a days-to-cover figure. The field sits next to the last sale and the session volume, both of which update in seconds, and it quietly inherits their air of currency. It should not. The short interest field is a photograph of a settlement date that has already passed, developed and released on a calendar FINRA publishes a year in advance. On September 22, 2026, the most recent FINRA short interest figure a US screen can be showing comes from the August 31 reporting settlement date. Member firms filed it by 6:00 p.m. Eastern on September 2. FINRA released it on September 10. The next figure, capturing September 15, does not reach the public until September 24. So for twelve calendar days, the field labeled short interest has been describing the last Monday in August. That is not a ...

Three Documented Reasons A Producer's Revenue Line Does Not Track The Crude Benchmark

A crude benchmark prints a number every trading day. A producer's income statement prints a different number four times a year. The distance between the two is neither noise nor mystery: most of it is written down in disclosure rules that specify exactly which prices a filer must report, where those prices are measured, and over what period they are averaged.

That distance matters most at the moment a position is being sized. Treating a benchmark move as a clean input into a producer's revenue line assumes a pass-through that the filings themselves never describe. What the filings describe instead is a chain: a realized price measured at the lease, a product mix that is not all crude, a derivative book disclosed in a format the filer selects, and a unit cost floor reported on its own line.

Below is an inventory of those documented gaps, with the rule text and public price series behind each. It is not a claim about direction, nor about how large a producer's equity response to a benchmark move ought to be. It is a narrower claim, about what the public record can support and what it cannot.

What a producer is required to report about price

Oil and gas registrants file under a dedicated set of items in Regulation S-K. Three of them govern price.

Item 1204(a) (17 CFR 229.1204(a)) requires that, for each of the last three fiscal years, a registrant disclose production by final product sold — oil, gas, and other products — and do so by geographical area, plus separately for each country and field that contains 15% or more of total proved reserves on an oil-equivalent-barrels basis. The phrase "by final product sold" carries the weight. Barrels of oil equivalent bundle molecules that clear at unrelated prices; the rule separates them precisely because one benchmark does not price them all.

Item 1204(b) requires, again by geographical area and for three fiscal years, two figures: "the average sales price (including transfers) per unit of oil, gas and other products produced," and "the average production cost, not including ad valorem and severance taxes, per unit of production." The first of those is the realized price. It is a reported number, not a benchmark, and the parenthetical on transfers matters for any filer moving volumes between its own segments.

Item 1202 (17 CFR 229.1202) governs reserves, disclosed in the aggregate, by geographic area, and for each country holding 15% or more of proved reserves. Paragraph (b) permits, but does not require, reserves estimated under different price and cost criteria; a filer that provides it must also "disclose the price and cost schedules and assumptions on which the disclosed values are based."

The price that drives the reserve estimate itself comes from Regulation S-X. Under 17 CFR 210.4-10(a)(22)(v), "the price shall be the average price during the 12-month period prior to the ending date of the period covered by the report, determined as an unweighted arithmetic average of the first-day-of-the-month price for each month within such period, unless prices are defined by contractual arrangements, excluding escalations based upon future conditions."

Twelve observations, one per month, first day of the month, equally weighted. A price move that begins after the eighth first-of-month observation contributes one twelfth of its magnitude to that year's average. Reserves are not indifferent to spot, but they are geared to a trailing average by rule, not by management discretion.

A benchmark move does not reach the income statement unchanged Every step below is a separate published requirement, not an assumption Benchmark quote: Cushing, OK WTI spot price, dollars per barrel Quality and location differential The price is set where the crude leaves the lease, not at the delivery point the benchmark describes. EIA defines the first purchase price as the price reported by the owner the first time crude is removed from the lease boundary. EIA glossary, First purchase price Realized price per unit of oil, gas and other products sold Product mix Item 1204(a) requires production for each of the last three fiscal years to be disclosed by final product sold - oil, gas and other products - and by geographical area. One crude benchmark prices only one of those lines. 17 CFR 229.1204(a) Revenue by final product sold Derivative positions Item 305 requires quantitative market-risk disclosure, but the filer chooses the format: a maturity-dated table of fair values, a sensitivity analysis, or value at risk. Commodity price risk is one of the four named categories. 17 CFR 229.305(a)(1) Revenue after derivative settlements Unit cost floor Item 1204(b)(2) requires the average production cost per unit of production, excluding ad valorem and severance taxes, disclosed by geographical area for three fiscal years. 17 CFR 229.1204(b)(2) Operating result per unit of production Reserves run on a different clock. The price is an unweighted arithmetic average of the first-day-of-the-month price for each month of the trailing 12 months, unless fixed by contract - 17 CFR 210.4-10(a)(22)(v). Spot reaches that figure only as the trailing average rolls.

Gap one: the barrel that is sold is not the barrel that is quoted

The most-quoted North American crude price is a delivery point. The EIA publishes it as "Cushing, OK WTI Spot Price FOB," series RWTC. A producer's barrel is priced somewhere else — at the lease. The EIA defines that price too: the first purchase price is "the price for domestic crude oil reported by the company that owns the crude oil the first time it is removed from the lease boundary."

Both series are public and monthly, so they can be differenced. The result is an observable measure of how far a realized barrel sits from the quoted one, and how much that distance itself moves.

Same benchmark, different realized barrel Monthly crude oil first purchase price minus Cushing WTI spot, dollars per barrel U.S. total North Dakota California -8 -6 -4 -2 +2 +4 0 Jan-25 Mar-25 May-25 Jul-25 Sep-25 Nov-25 Jan-26 Mar-26 May-26 17-month averages: U.S. -1.74 | North Dakota -6.04 | California +0.76 Differential, $ per barrel Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration. First purchase prices: series F000000__3 (U.S.), F002038__3 (North Dakota), F005006__3 (California). Benchmark: series RWTC, Cushing, OK WTI Spot Price FOB. Monthly averages, January 2025 - May 2026. Differential computed as first purchase price minus RWTC. May 2026 values are preliminary in the EIA release.

Over the 17 months from January 2025 through May 2026, the U.S. first purchase price averaged $1.74 per barrel below Cushing WTI. That aggregate hides the useful part. North Dakota averaged $6.04 below the benchmark and did not trade above it in a single one of those 17 months, reaching $7.19 below in May 2025. California averaged $0.76 above the benchmark, and moved between $4.65 above in March 2026 and $3.62 below in May 2026.

Three consequences follow, and none of them require a view on price direction.

  • Two domestic producers can have opposite signs against the same benchmark. Through most of 2025 a North Dakota barrel and a California barrel differed by $7 to $9 per barrel in their relationship to the identical quoted price. In March 2026 the gap between those two differentials reached $11.33.
  • The differential is not a constant that can be carried forward. North Dakota's discount held in a $5.35 to $7.19 band for 16 straight months and then closed to $0.07 in May 2026. A model that hard-codes last year's basis is carrying an assumption, not a measurement.
  • The benchmark itself is plural. Europe Brent (RBRTE) exceeded Cushing WTI by an average of $3.64 per barrel across calendar 2025, within a narrow $2.28 to $4.59 range. In April 2026 that same spread was $16.97; by June 2026 it was $0.59. A producer's exposure depends on which of those two curves its barrels price against.

A caveat belongs on this data. The first purchase price is a transaction price for domestic crude at the lease: not company-specific, excluding natural gas and other products, and measured before any derivative settlement. It establishes the existence and rough scale of location and quality differentials. It does not substitute for a filer's own Item 1204(b)(1) disclosure.

Gap two: the hedge is disclosed, but the format is the filer's choice

Derivatives sit between a realized price and a revenue line. They are covered by Item 305 (17 CFR 229.305), "Quantitative and Qualitative Disclosures About Market Risk." Commodity price risk is one of the four exposure categories the item names, alongside interest rate risk, foreign currency exchange rate risk, and other relevant market risks such as equity price risk. Instruments must also be separated between those entered into for trading purposes and those entered into for purposes other than trading.

The quantitative requirement, though, is satisfied by any one of three alternatives, and the choice belongs to the registrant.

One requirement, three formats, and they are not comparable 17 CFR 229.305(a)(1) lets the filer pick any one of these for commodity price risk Tabular presentation 229.305(a)(1)(i) What it puts on the page • Fair values of the market risk    sensitive instruments • Contract terms sufficient to    determine future cash flows • Categorized by expected maturity    date What it still leaves open • No estimate of the earnings    effect of a given price move Sensitivity analysis 229.305(a)(1)(ii) What it puts on the page • Potential loss in future    earnings, fair values or cash    flows • Under one or more selected    hypothetical price changes • Over a selected period of time What it still leaves open • The hypothetical change is    selected by the filer, not fixed    by rule Value at risk 229.305(a)(1)(iii) What it puts on the page • Potential loss over a selected    period of time • With a selected likelihood of    occurrence What it still leaves open • Nothing about the size of a loss    beyond that likelihood And there may be nothing to read at all: under 17 CFR 229.305(e) a smaller reporting company is not required to provide the information required by this Item.

The practical effect is that two producers with similar hedge books can file disclosures that are not comparable line for line. A maturity-dated table of fair values supports a cash-flow reconstruction but gives no direct read on earnings sensitivity. A sensitivity analysis gives an earnings figure, under a hypothetical price change the filer selects. A value-at-risk figure gives a loss at a chosen likelihood over a chosen horizon, and is silent on the tail beyond it.

The qualitative half of the item is the part that is often skimmed and is frequently the most informative. Paragraph (b)(1) calls for the registrant's primary market risk exposures, "how those exposures are managed," including "a discussion of the objectives, general strategies, and instruments, if any, used to manage those exposures," and any changes in those exposures or in how they are managed relative to the most recently completed fiscal year and what is known or expected in future periods. That last clause is the one that flags a hedge program being wound down or extended.

And there is a floor case worth checking before assuming any of this is available. Under 17 CFR 229.305(e), a smaller reporting company, as defined by 17 CFR 229.10(f)(1), is not required to provide the information required by the item at all. For a small-capitalization producer, the derivative layer of the chain may be absent from the record entirely.

Gap three: break-even is quoted in benchmark terms too

The third layer is cost. Item 1204(b)(2) supplies the reported historical figure — average production cost per unit, excluding ad valorem and severance taxes. For a forward-looking view of the same floor, the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas surveys operators directly.

In the first-quarter 2026 Dallas Fed Energy Survey, collected March 11 to 19, 2026, firms reported the following, as averages of company responses:

  • $43 per barrel to cover operating expenses on existing wells, up from $41 a year earlier, with regional averages ranging from $34 to $47.
  • $66 per barrel to profitably drill a new well, against $65 when the question was asked in the prior year's first-quarter survey, with regional averages ranging from $62 to $70. The Permian Basin average was $67, up from $65.
  • A wide split by size: large firms, defined as producing 10,000 barrels per day or more as of the fourth quarter of 2025, reported $32 for operating expenses and $59 to drill. Small firms reported $46 and $68 respectively.

Two things change how those numbers should be used. First, they are survey responses rather than audited filings, and averages conceal a distribution. Second, the survey question is asked in WTI terms. The figures are benchmark-referenced, exactly like the quote on the screen.

Combine that with the first gap and the arithmetic becomes concrete. A producer selling into a persistent $6.04 discount to Cushing does not reach a $66 WTI-referenced drilling break-even when WTI prints $66; on that differential it reaches it when WTI is near $72. The same benchmark print sits on opposite sides of the threshold depending on where the barrel leaves the ground. The $34-to-$47 and $62-to-$70 regional ranges the survey reports are themselves partly a differential story.

What this changes about position sizing

None of the above forecasts anything; it redistributes uncertainty. When a benchmark moves and a producer's equity is the instrument under consideration, four quantities stand between the move and the operating result, each knowable to a different degree:

  • The realized differential — measurable historically from Item 1204(b)(1) and from EIA regional series, but not fixed, as the May 2026 convergence shows.
  • Product mix — reported under Item 1204(a), stable over quarters, and the cheapest of the four to check.
  • Hedge coverage — disclosed under Item 305 in a format the filer chose, and sometimes not disclosed at all.
  • The unit cost floor — reported historically under Item 1204(b)(2), and survey-estimated forward, in benchmark terms that themselves need a differential adjustment.

A position sized as though a benchmark move maps one-to-one onto operating results is sized against one variable while four are moving. The conservative handling is not to abandon the trade but to treat the benchmark as the first term in a chain, and to size against the width of the chain.

What Would Invalidate This

This frame is a description of disclosure and price structure. Several conditions narrow or break it.

  • The differential can compress to irrelevance. In May 2026 the North Dakota discount was $0.07 and the U.S. aggregate first purchase price sat $2.75 above Cushing WTI. When basis is that tight, the first gap contributes almost nothing and the extra analysis buys little.
  • A fully hedged producer over a short horizon has a different problem. If Item 305 disclosure shows near-complete coverage of near-dated volumes, realized-price analysis for that window is largely moot, and the exposure that remains is counterparty, basis-risk, and roll-related rather than flat price.
  • Integrated and diversified issuers do not fit the chain. Where refining, marketing, chemicals, or midstream contribute materially, a crude move enters through several channels with offsetting signs. The chain described here applies to producing activities, not to a consolidated enterprise.
  • Filing cadence limits the update rate. Item 1204 disclosures arrive on a three-fiscal-year, periodic-report schedule. EIA first purchase prices are released with a lag of roughly two months and the most recent month is preliminary. Both are unsuitable inputs for an intraday or multi-day horizon.
  • Equity prices are set by more than realized prices. Balance sheet, capital allocation, index and sector flows, and market-wide risk appetite move producer equities independently of the barrel. Nothing here claims the chain is the dominant term.
  • The disclosure requirements can change. Every citation here is to the rule text as published. If the item text or the Regulation S-X pricing definition is amended, the specific mechanics described above stop being current.

Concrete Framework

A repeatable pre-position checklist, in the order that discards the most candidates soonest.

  1. Identify the product mix first. Pull Item 1204(a) production by final product sold. If crude is a minority of revenue-weighted output, a crude-benchmark thesis is mismatched to the issuer before any other step matters.
  2. Locate the barrels. Item 1204(a) and Item 1202 both require geographic-area disclosure and separate treatment of any country or field at 15% or more of proved reserves. Write down where production sits.
  3. Measure the differential rather than assume it. Compare the Item 1204(b)(1) average sales price against the benchmark for the same periods, and cross-check the region against EIA first purchase price series. Record the average and the range, not just the average.
  4. Test whether the differential is stable. Look at the widest and narrowest months in the sample, not the mean. A basis that has moved $7 in one month is a variable, not a constant.
  5. Read Item 305 for format before content. Note which of the three alternatives the filer used, since that determines what can be extracted. Confirm the filer is not a smaller reporting company exempt under 229.305(e).
  6. Read Item 305(b)(1)(iii) specifically. Changes in exposures or in how they are managed, versus the prior fiscal year and expected future periods, are where a shifting hedge program becomes visible.
  7. Set the cost floor in differential-adjusted terms. Take the Item 1204(b)(2) unit production cost, add the survey-based benchmark break-even if a forward view is needed, then adjust by the differential measured in step three. A benchmark-terms break-even is not a benchmark-terms trigger.
  8. Check the reserve clock separately. Under 210.4-10(a)(22)(v), reserve figures respond to a trailing 12-month unweighted first-day-of-month average. Do not expect a recent spot move to appear in a reserve line in the same period it happened.
  9. Size against the chain, not the benchmark. Aggregate the ranges from steps three through seven into a plausible band for the operating result, and size the position against that band. If the band is wider than the intended stop distance, the position is too large for the information available.
  10. Re-run steps three and five each reporting period. Differentials and hedge coverage both reset. A checklist completed two quarters ago is a record, not a current input.

That producer equities and crude do not move in lockstep is correct as far as it goes. The useful part is not the size of the gap but its composition, and every component named above is published, cited, and checkable before a position is opened.

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